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The Middle Ground 
Edmund E. Jacobitti 
Review-essay on New Vico Studies, Vol. III. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press, 1985; and Bollettino del centro di studi vichiani. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1985. 
Bleib nicht au£ ebnem Feld! 
Steig nicht zu hoch hinaus! 
Am schonsten sieht die Welt 
Von halber Hohe aus. 
-Nietzsche 
There are certain obvious differences between New Vico 
Studies, with its emphasis upon Vico's relevance to the twentieth 
century, and the Bollettino del centro di studi vichiani, with its em-
phasis upon situating Vico in the context of his own time. 
Moreover, Bollettino's concentration on the earlier period is not a 
result of the fact that the issue here under review was published 
in conjunction with the recent Mostra on Civilta del Seicento a Napoli. 
It is rather a natural outgrowth of its founder's program. 
Bollettino was founded in 1971 as an annual review by the 
late Pietro Piovani, whose still-evident program was to set Vico 
in his own time and overcome, among other things, the idealist 
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view that Vico was but a precursor of Croce. This issue of Bollettino 
describes the Naples of Vico' s birth, a kingdom in full seventeenth-
century crisis where government, language, hierarchy, agreed-
upon forms and relationships-all the ingredients of common 
sense-had become questionable, an order of things in transition, 
no longer feudal and not yet modern. 
It was a culture traced in Vincenzo Pacelli's "L'ideologia del 
potere nella ritrattistica napoletana del seicento." Pacelli, in effect, 
uses both sides of the palette to describe not only the revolutionary 
changes in style ushered in by Caravaggio and i caravaggeschi, but 
the rise of the bourgeois class who, more and more, were finan-
cially able to ape the nobility and have themselves painted on 
canvas, sculpted in marble, frescoed on walls, and woven into 
tapestries by the great artists of the time-Caravaggio, Bolgi, 
Finelli, Selitto, and so on. Pacelli notes similar changes in the kind 
of art that appeared in the Church. As the purchasing power of 
the landed nobility declined and that of the newly monied class 
grew, the ecclesiastical authorities became more and more in-
terested in the bourgeoisie, more and more willing to sell them 
the space for chapels in the great churches of Naples. A veritable 
scramble to sell and buy the chapels took place as rival families 
staked out turf in the holy sanctuaries and the moneychangers 
moved back into the temple: 
thus while the De Franchis, the Spinelli, the Carafa had their chapels 
in san Domenico Maggiore and the Cortone, Fontana, Noris, and 
Coreggio, the Fenaroli-all contractors, Lombard nobles, great mer-
chants, and moneychangers-took over and decorated the chapels 
in sant' Anna dei Lombardi, the ever active bankers Spinola and 
Costa took up their places in san Giorgio dei Genovesi. . . . the 
Borello family found space at Gesu Nuovo, Francesco Rocco at 
Pieta dei Turchini, Giulio Mastrilli at Purgatorio ad Arco . .. 
and so on ad infinitum (212). The growing number of middle-class 
family portraits, the number of chapels filled with marble statuary 
and sarcophaghi immortalizing bourgeois entrepreneurs like 
De Franchi, Cesareo, Mastrilli, Cacace and so on serve as artistic 
testimony to the growing power of money, the rise not (yet) of 
l'uomo qualunque, but l'homme bourgeois. 
The decline of the old order in political philosophy is set out 
in Enrico Nuzzo's "I percorsi della 'quiete,' " which brilliantly 
traces the efforts of Giovanni Antonio Palazzo and Ottavio Sam-
marco--those symptoms of seventeenth-century political crisis-
to wrestle with Botero' s and Machiavelli's notions of ragion di 
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stato---and still preserve the fixed Aristotelian models and forms. 
Yet-try as they might-as change escaped man's ability to control 
it, as casuistic interpretation crept into counter-reformation religion 
and politics, the old "Aristotelian" theories (really, by now an 
Aristotle Christianized, censored, and warmed up for vegetarians) 
were no longer able to explain reality. In fact, despite all the efforts 
of Palazzo to redefine ragione di stato into VERA ragione di stato, 
that is, raison d'etat without etatisme, the serpent, we read, was 
already in the garden: right and wrong were hopelessly confused 
and decline was imminent. It was that imminence of decline that 
led Sammarco to renounce all change and opt for the status quo. 
We see similar evidence of the accelerating social conflict and 
shattered common sense in Pier Luigi Rovito' s discussion of 
whether the Kingdom of Naples was a feudal or modern state in 
his article "Funzioni pubbliche e capitalismo signorile," and in 
Aurelio Musi' s "Tra burocrati e notabili" as well as Giovanni 
Muto' s "Problema monetario." 
New Vico Studies is the still-growing creation of the tireless 
Giorgio Tagliacozzo, director of the Institute of Vico Studies in 
New York. Tagliacozzo, like Piovani, has imprinted his own 
perspective on his journal. Tagliacozzo' s central thesis is that ours 
is an age peculiarly ready for and already open to Vico, an age 
fed up with the Cartesian cogito, mechanical ratio, and shallow 
speculation. It is a thesis hard to deny when one contemplates 
the number and diversity of thinkers influenced by Vico, among 
which-to name only a few-we find Isaiah Berlin, Hayden White, 
H. S. Hughes, Louis Mink, Max Fisch, Norman 0. Brown, Max 
Horkheimer, Jurgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Northrop Frye, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Stephen Toulmin, Ernesto Grassi, and so 
on. The accuracy of Tagliacozzo' s theory is all the more evident 
as one peruses his opening article in each issue of New Vico Studies. 
In these articles, Tagliacozzo traces the origin and growth of the 
contemporary interest in Vic~n interest also evident in the 
collections of articles periodically edited by Tagliacozzo, Verene, 
and White that also aim at examining Vico's relationship not to 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but to the twentieth. 
The general philosophical thrust of Tagliacozzo' s journal is 
evident in the articles and review-essays which stress the key 
points of Vico' s relevance to our contemporary world. The central 
feature of this contemporary world is the disintegration of the 
rationalist empire that had, in the seventeenth century, estab-
lished Cartesian ratio as a-or rather THE-only permissible form 
of wisdom, a form that supposedly banished skepticism and gave 
man a fixed standard for measuring a supposedly fixed Newtonian 
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world. Reducing a complex world to pretty theoretical schemes 
became, for more than 300 years, the measure of great thought-
until today when, with the collapse of that standard, we find 
ourselves in the so-called crisis of modernity. It is a crisis that, 
like a bath of cold water, has brought us back to a face-to-face 
confrontation with reality undisguised by wishful thinking and 
whistlinp in the dark. It is a crisis set out in so much contemporary 
thought but nowhere better than in Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard's pro-
vocative 1979 La Condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir. 2 Lyotard 
surveys the remains, noting the failures of those seemingly invin-
cible rationalist metanarratives that once swept away local fables 
and narratives with their inexorable logique; and he advocates, in 
the place of the all-encompassing metaprison, what he calls "local 
determinism," which is not too different from what Deleuze calls 
"particularistic lines of flight." 
Vico long ago chastised men of mere abstract theory ("Men 
of limited ideas take for law what the words expressly say"), 
predicted the collapse of "abstract reason run amok" ("Learned 
fools fell to calumniating the truth"), and noted-against those 
who sought to avoid the harshness of the world-that "the world 
is always governed by those who are naturally the best (migliori). "3 
It is from the smoke and rubble of the rationalist empire that 
Vico emerges as a guide to lead us back to reality, to a more 
sober-minded and realistic assessment of man's place in the 
world-an assessment set out long before the rationalist pipe 
dream swept us off our feet. Vico leads us back to that branch of 
ancient wisdom that teaches that man does not find the world 
fixed and stable before him, an arena in which he is free to wander 
about and take the measure. Vico teaches us, instead, the verum 
factum convertuntur, teaches us that the world is made by human 
beings. Vico, in short, points us to the relationship of mythos and 
logos; and his pioneering role is plain from the fact that, because 
of the verum-ipsum-factum, he saw this relationship long before 
we, with our current post-structuralist perspective, were led to 
similar conclusions. 
The relationship between mythos and logos is the subject of 
Jose Faur's New Vico Studies article, "The Splitting of the Logos: 
Some Remarks on Vico and Rabbinic Tradition." Faur-following 
Verene, Grassi, and others--€xamines the Western idea that 
"knowledge" comes only after we filter off rhetoric, leaving behind 
the pure gold of ratio. As Faur points out, Vico's alternative wis-
dom rests on a logos and mythos that are not separate but interre-
lated. The ultimate implications of the verum!factum, in short, are 
that man does not find the world, he founds it. He is not, therefore, 
a discoverer, but a creator . This "founding" takes place, according 
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to Vico, because of early man's poetic, creative nature. This is the 
key discovery of the Scienza nuova; and it makes Vico extremely 
modern, placing him among those who see language not as a 
transparent instrument for finding truth, but as man's method 
for constituting truth. Long before Marti!) Heidegger began his 
quest for the nature of true being and unified presence, Vico saw 
that being was not outside man but within him. Heidegger's quest, 
in other words, was a case of tail-chasing. 
In this sense, we may appreciate as well Hwa Yol Jung's 
article in New Vico Studies, "Vico and Bakhtin: A Prolegomenon 
to any Future Comparison," which stresses that "for Bakhtin as 
for Vico, language cannot be separated from the conception of 
reality or the world" (158). Likewise, Stephan Daniel, in "Vico 
and Mythic Figuration as Prerequisite for Philosophic Literacy," 
also in New Vico Studies, provides an analysis of the "union of 
sense-based language and sense-based nature" and of Vico' s dis-
covery of the "mythic forms of thought that lie at the base of 
rational inquiry" (61). 
The idea that verum is the factum of man should not, however, 
leave us with the idea that Vico's is an intellectual topics. In fact, it 
is, as Nancy Struever ("Rhetoric and Philosophy in Vichian Inquiry") 
and Daniel emphasize, a sensory topics, and it is this sensory 
element that keeps Vico grounded in the real world rather than 
in idealist metaphysics. Vico's topics, in short, provided him long 
ago with a ready-to-hand method for getting to die Sache selbst. 
Likewise, we might add, Vichian topics also provide us with 
an alternative to subjectivist Cartesianism, for Vico' s topics are 
not grounded in the first-person singular, but in the first-person 
plural. The litmus test of Vichian reason/practice is sensus com-
munis: that which is held in "common." On the other hand, hostile 
as Vico was to the anarchic epistemological standard of the ego, 
he does not envision the erasure of the subject, for both subject 
and other are required in order to account for the developing 
sensus communis that surrounds and shapes us and which we, in 
turn, shape. 
In Bollettino and New Vico Studies, we have, in short, two 
journals with different frames of reference. Still, there is an evident 
convergence of perspectives; for despit~r perhaps because of-
Bollettino' s concentration on the barocco, the journal provides us 
with a past world that is, with all its dissolving certainties, unnerv-
ingly familiar to our own post-modern world. The seventeenth 
century, like our own time, was witness to the dissolution of the 
quick fix, the ready answer, the narrative and the metanarrative. 
And, because our age is so similar to the baroque, Tagliacozzo is 
right about the timeliness of Vico for our own problems. 
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Still, many eras are similar to our own; and, as New Vico 
Studies frequently points out, there is more to Vico' s timeliness 
than the eerie similarity of his age to ours. There is also the pro-
fundity and, well, ready-to-handedness, of his thought-an aspect 
of Vico more likely to stand out in Tagliacozzo' s journal than in 
the Bollettino, which is more strictly historical. 
One of the disturbing things for Italian scholars today is the 
lack of interest in Italian studies among American and English-
speaking scholars. Everyone has heard of Machiavelli, Dante, Boc-
caccio-the whole Italian Renaissance. But at the end of the seven-
teenth century, at least as popular scholarly opinion has it, the 
light went out. There were, of course, a few brief meteoric flashes 
from Italy-De Sanctis, Croce, Gramsci-but, on the whole, the 
center of focus shifted in the eighteenth century to France and in 
the nineteenth to Germany. And today our minds still remain 
focused somewhere between the post-structuralist pouvoirlsavoir 
and il n'y a rien hors du texte on the one hand, and the hermeneutic 
search for pure being, unified presence, and Horizontverschmelzung 
on the other. Were it not for the fact that we know that academic 
minds too (and maybe academic minds more than others) like to 
tread only on familiar ground, we might find it odd that so many 
Anglo-American intellectuals today should still focus their atten-
tion almost exclusively on France and Germany. Certainly, part 
of the importance of New Vico Studies stems from its ability to 
awaken us to a whole, hitherto ignored, intellectual environment. 
The value of Bollettino is, ironically, also important for the 
same reason; for even Italian intellectuals seem to have been mes-
merized by oltralpini thinkers whose traditions, in fact, provided 
the icons of the now evidently discredited Western "religion" of 
rationalism. And even though scholars and thinkers in France 
and Germany now appear to be in full retreat from those imaginary 
objective worlds, the doubts, questions, and problems raised on 
their retreats have themselves simmered for so long in their respec-
tive national contextual stews that their answers, too, seem to 
bear a kind of national flavor. 
It is time to look elsewhere-not back to Heidegger's pre-Soc-
ratics or to a misunderstood Plato trivialized into a Cartesian 
rationalist-but back to the rhetoric of the Renaissance, even back 
to the (supposedly nonexistent) intellectual traditions of Rome as 
found in Cicero, Horace, and Quintilian; and finally, back to the true 
Plato, to Isocrates, the Aristotle of the Topics, and to Aristophanes. 
In this, Vico---one of the few moderns to understand this 
other tradition-can play the key role, for his moderate rejection 
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of rationalism walked a middle ground between Hobbes's baroque 
bravado and Pascal's angst-ridden flip of the coin. 
It is not possible to say, reading these journals, what Vico's 
most important message was--there were too many of them-but 
three, it appears to me, stand out. First and surely one of the 
most important of Vico' s insights was his following out of the 
verum-ipsum-factum, which he expounded in the De antiquissima 
Italorum sapientia [On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians]. This 
led Vico to a rejection of res cogitans and res extensa and to a 
conflation of mythos and logos. This is the "ground" for nearly all 
modern thought and far more fertile than the Abgrund that seems 
up to now to have received all our attention. 
Second was Vico' s effort to reawaken our appreciation of the 
natural instability of human affairs by recalling the ancients' theory 
of cyclical history. It is important to put this in a modem perspec-
tive. Vico' s theory of cycles is neither a fixed a priori nor a dismissal 
of all things fixed. The corso e ricorso of states, men, groups, religions, 
and so forth is again a moderate middle ground. It stands midway 
between the extreme post-structuralist flight into what Prezzolini 
(unfortunately, with approbation) liked to call "the night, the 
mystery, and the secret," and the Germanic trek back to a camouf-
laged Prim um Mobile. 
Like many modem structuralists, Vico also noticed that there 
was a kind of pattern to society's signs. This pattern is not, however, 
a fixed structure, but a corso, a passage through three kinds of 
natures, customs, natural laws, governments, languages, reasons, 
and so on. This is the natural course of all things man-made. 
This cycle is not a deus ex machina, but merely the norm-like 
man's own birth, life, and death-lived out by most but not all 
states. It has no definite time span and merely states that all things 
man-made will perish and that moderation in theory and practice 
is the only way to prolong the cycle. The cycle provides, in short, 
a flexible "structural" prism through which life can be viewed. It 
is not, however, a hymn to resignation nor a magic formula or 
incantation: Aufhebung! Fizz! Goop! as one wag put it. 
Moreover, the cycle is not one universal cycle, but many 
intersecting ones. It is not only the cycle of one's own state that 
accounts for the complexity of the world, but that of other states, 
of classes, nations, groups, or all mankind together. Indeed, as 
everyone has a perspective shaped to some extent by his place in 
one or more corsi, man's opinions about how the corso might be 
flattened out constitute themselves a kind of cycle. The only unity 
is provided by the fact that our focus is always on and shaped by 
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the rise and fall of the various orders of things. Stability, structure, 
the state of nature, the thoughts of God and Weltgeists, 
functionalism, Kantian a prioris, and so on-provide us with 
abstract fantasies and shield our vision of the true nature of things. 
A major difference between Vico' s structuralism and the more 
rigid varieties of the once-fashionable modern structuralists, lies 
in the fact that because of the complexity of the convergent cycles, 
Vico did not believe a totalist reduction of society through univer-
sal semanticization was possible. In Vico there is always conflict, 
difference, asymmetry-in short, politics. Everyone has a different 
perspective; and unity is, blessedly, inconceivable. Because the 
puzzle never seems to have all the pieces, one can never eliminate 
what Habermas dismisses as "border warfare." In short, Vico 
shares a bit of Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard's applause for "local deter-
minism." 
On the other hand, the difference between Vico and modern 
Neronian radicalism lies in the fact that-while there is difference 
(and differance) in Vico-langue, synchrony, and everything else 
is not reduced simply to the event, to parole, to just "one damned 
thing after another." Vico's is a middle ground between deter-
minism and voluntarism, between, on the one hand, a meaning-
less temporality, a diachronic a posteriori and, on the other, a 
mechanical Cartesianism or a Germanic, concealed, ever-disclos-
ing a priori Weltgeist. Vico, in short, leaves us with an explanation 
of asymmetry that is lodged in the real Heraclitian nature of "the 
things themselves," in the corsi e ricorsi: not a cure-all, but a realistic 
analytical tool. 
The importance of our recognition of this natural flux of 
things, of the corso-an embarrassment, of course, to all self-
respecting and proper Moderns who believe everything must 
either be meaningless or fixed-is set out, among other places, 
in Emanuele Riverso's analysis of "History as Metascience," which 
established the "cultural impact of one nation upon another" and 
the dislocations that result. 
The uniqueness and the importance of the cycle stand out as 
well in Timothy Bahti's suggestive "Vico and Frye: A Note," in 
New Vico Studies, where the meaning of time and of "keeping 
time" -whether God's or man' s---is used to provide a basis for 
meaning itself. Bahti explains the Vichian base of Frye's famous 
analysis of meaning as humanity's attempt to link its own activity 
to that of nature. Time becomes not chronological and historical 
but horizontal and reflects a series of concentric, converging circles 
of human meaning. In Frye's case, of course, it is literature that 
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converges and interacts with the other ievels of human meaning. 
A third important lesson we can gain from Vico is his political 
realism. Certainly the key message of Nancy Struever's brilliant 
and insightful Petrarchan/Socratic injunction to seriously address 
the issue of "how we shall live" brings this realism to mind. Thus, 
she reminds us that the proper course for Vico was the middle one; 
for Vico's rhetoric is not a destruction of philosophy as such, but 
a destruction of "moralistic and moralizing philosophy," of 
"academic colonization of the philosophical task." Vico is not 
Jacques Derrida or Paul De Man; nor is he the classical, "moral," 
civic humanist designed by Hans Baron. Thus, as Professor 
Struever puts it, if you start down the Derridean and Demanian 
path, "you can't stop," while-if I may paraphrase it-if you re-
main in the realm of "simplistic Whiggish and civic humanist 
assumptions," you cannot start. 
In conclusion, we might say that both journals lead one to 
an appreciation of Vico's place in modern thought-even though 
Bollettino gets us there by dint of a kind of Vichian providence. 
In any case, both the Vico of the seventeenth and eighteenth and 
the Vico of the twentieth century are necessary; for the point is 
to remind non-Italians of Vico's way and to recall Italians to their 
own traditions; for, as Bertrando Spaventa noted almost a hundred 
years ago, even though "we got there late, we were first": 4 now 
there is a post-modern paradox! 
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